Basque purse-seiners exploiting mackerel, anchovy and tuna and the off-shore trawlers targeting hake, megrim and anglerfish, (iv) the Southwest English demersal fishery. Faced with increasing constraints on accessing fish stocks, management measures have evolved for each local case study towards fishing rights individualisation, limited access and other specific management measures.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out a conceptual approach to governance in fisheries management, highlighting the main themes involved at a regional level (governance issue, management measures). Section 3 describes the case studies by country across the Western Waters (in terms of species, gears and fleets). Section 4 explains the management governance at an EU and national levels, and inter-relationships between both levels. Past and existing management measures are presented in Section 5 based on stakeholder´s experiences for all four countries. Finally, Section 6 presents a discussion of the main results showing progress realized during the second CFP reform (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) .
A conceptual approach of governance in fisheries management
In the literature devoted to governance issues in fisheries, cooperatives, rights-based management, leadership, social capital and regionalization are the main concepts used to highlight the main academic themes.
One of the major recent trends in the fishing sector has been the increasing role of fishermen's cooperatives in quota management (Holland et al., 2013) . In France and in the UK, the central administration has gradually transferred the allocation procedures for quotas to POs. In view of quota over-consumption situations, POs have had to introduce new rules within their organizations to impose limitations on individual consumption by species. The implementation of individual fishing rights (France, Spain, UK) or access restrictions (Celtic Sea herring in Ireland) reflects the European debate on transferable fishing concessions (TFC) within the third reform of the CFP.
Several kinds of rights-based management exist and quotas can be allocated to the owner, the vessel, but also to a collective i.e. a community or cooperative (Costello et al., 2008) .
Quota can be spatial and concern one or several species. Their transferability is not necessarily without limits. Overall, a rights-based management system could be adapted to different fisheries. The success of rights-based management, specifically transferable fishing concessions in the new CFP reform (EC, 2013) , depends on the governance arrangements which could be a top-down procedure or a regionalized approach Gezelius et al., 2010) . Other assets required for better fisheries management such as leadership amongst direct users of fisheries . All attributes related to co-management (cooperatives, social capital, leadership, regionalisation, right-based management) are key-elements of the institutional arrangements. Table 1 offers a synthesis of an analytical framework for fisheries co-management describing five broad types. Raakjaer, 2009 and This typology is rooted in the classification proposed by , which considered five institutional arrangements between Government and local stakeholders. Only one type of fisheries management process can be defined as a pure co-management scheme (co-management by partnership), where Government and users of the marine resource (fishermen, processors, non-governmental organizations) act as decision-making partners The main characteristics explored through interviews and focus groups are internal factors of regional and local fisheries. These internal factors can be rights and rules adopted by fishermen, their legitimacy and their enforcement compliance, power structures inside institutional and organizational arrangements, and leadership 
Irish fleets targeting Celtic Sea Herring
There are two distinct Irish fleets targeting Celtic Sea herring. The main fishery, which is allocated 89% of the Irish quota, comprises vessels mainly over 15 meters in length and has a mix of multipurpose vessels which switch between pelagic and demersal species throughout the year and solely pelagic vessels which use refrigerated sea water tanks to store their catch.
There is also a small-scale fleet, known as the sentinel fishery, which is allocated 11% of the quota and which can fish inside a specific area closed to fishing by larger vessels in order to UK. In the UK quota management has been substantially devolved to the POs since the 1980s (Hatcher, 1997) . Each year the UK national quotas are allocated to the POs who then have responsibility for allocating quota to the individual vessels they represent and managing quota uptake throughout the year. Until 1999 PO quota allocations were based upon average landings of member vessels over the previous three years, but from 1999 these historical rights were "frozen" as Fixed Quota Allocations (FQAs). The FQA holdings of individual vessels now determine the percentages of the UK quotas which the POs receive each year.
Each PO can determine how it chooses to allocate quota amongst its membership, for example using individual quotas (IQs) or monthly landings limits from a common quota pool. For the most part, quota uptake by the inshore (10m overall length and under) fleet as well as those few offshore vessels which do not belong to a PO is managed directly by the national fisheries administrations or their appointed agencies (the Marine Management Organisation -MMOin the case of England and Wales). Most UK POs, including those described in this article, are legally constituted as "mutual" societies (cooperatives) but a few are established as private companies. Although quota is not explicitly tradeable in the UK, FQA entitlements can be transferred between licences and there is an active in-year lease market for quota which takes advantage of relaxed rules permitting quota exchanges between POs. 
Management measures

Ireland: Restriction of access
The area of rights based management represents one of the major problems facing the Irish Celtic Sea Herring fishery (Fitzpatrick, 2014a) . Prior to 2012 there was an open access situation in the fishery for vessels under 25 meters in length which had an automatic entitlement to fish for herring. The recent success in rebuilding the stock has resulted in a classic free rider issue with increased numbers of larger vessels booking in to the fishery. 
UK: Mixed views on quota trading
In the UK there are mixed views on quota trading and this is to some extent reflected in the differences between POs in the way in which quota is allocated internally. In Scotland, for example, many of the PO administrations continue to take a strong position against quota trading and operate quota pools for all stocks. In England and Wales, more POs operate IQ systems for at least some stocks and some vessels. In the South West, the CFPO has adopted what is commonly known as a "pool-plus" system, whereby quota is pooled but individual vessels are able to supplement their monthly landings limits from the pool with quota leased privately from other vessels. Where vessels have acquired additional FQA units, these effectively give rise to IQs. The SWFPO operates IQs for most of its membership, although a group of smaller inshore vessels do work within a quota pool. Many UK POs operating quota pools hold some FQAs centrally (on so-called "dummy" licences) which are used for the benefit of the membership as a whole. Both the CFPO and, to a lesser extent, the SWFPO, have invested in FQAs in order to secure additional quota for the membership as a whole. The CFPO also holds FQAs acquired by the Dutchy Fish Quota Company which aims to secure 4 Ley 23-1997 reguladora de la pesca de altura en el Atlántico Nordeste.
quota for the benefit of fishermen in Cornwall. Both POs assist their members with quota trading where required, for example by arranging exchanges ("swaps") with other UK POs via the Marine Management Organisation (MMO), but are not otherwise actively involved in quota trading: there are a number of private companies which act as brokers in this market.
Although day-to-day management decisions are taken by the PO offices, decisions on quota management approaches are taken by elected representative boards or at general meetings.
Management progress;
Collecting information on fisheries management measures requires the implementation of both qualitative (Silverman, 2010) and quantitative techniques. This paper, however, relates only to the former. Firstly, semi-structured face-to-face interviews with fishermen's representatives were used to analyse fisheries governance issues, such as centralized or decentralized processes, relationships between local, national and European Government with stakeholders, the role of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), among others. Secondly, focus groups with fishermen were used to examine issues related to fisheries management measures and more importantly, issues related to fishermen's behaviour, in particular compliance behaviour. The main reason for the interview/focus group structure is the fact that fishermen usually take part in the decision process via their representative's participation in RACs and/or other forums, which makes it more difficult or easier for the fishermen/representatives to speak freely about governance issues. Each western waters case study selected the most appropriate technique (semi-structured interviews or focus groups, or both) for collecting qualitative information on stakeholders' (mainly fishermen's representatives or fishermen) perceptions of past and existing fisheries management measures.
Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were organized to examine the French Producers organizations managing the sole fishery in the Bay of Biscay. For the Irish fleets targeting the Celtic Sea Herring fishery, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted simultaneously with choice experiment surveys. Additionally meetings of the management advisory committee were attended as a research observer. In the Basque case study, interviews were organized with local fishermen representatives, while focus groups were organized with both local fishermen and local scientists. Information on devolved quota management in South West England was obtained through semi-structured interviews with representatives of the two Producers' Organisations (POs) which are responsible for the majority of fishing vessels in the region.
France
Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were carried out with official representatives of all 9
French POs concerned with the sole fishery in the Bay of Biscay in June and July 2012 (Lagière et al. 2013 ). Limitations to fisheries access have changed fishing behaviour in several main ways. The stakeholders interviewed declared that fishing effort reallocation has occurred as a result of individualisation of landings, and/or sole production is more frequently spread over the year. Other changes relate to a reduced number of days at sea for the most specialised gillnetters. Some exits from the industry or from sole fishery have been registered.
Another crucial issue addresses fishermen. Crew members are more attracted to vessels owning the largest share of sole sub-quotas. Hence some POs are confronted with a deck-hand turnover between members. These interviews showed that compliance with sub-quotas and national quota is possible by strengthening the monitoring and management system of the fishery and by more individualised production management within POs.
Ireland
How fishermen will respond to this access change and whether it will result in rationalization or consolidation of fishing rights is still uncertain, as the new policy has only been implemented since 2012. Information from PO representatives indicates that there is a growing appetite for tradeable licences within the fishery. A choice experiment survey conducted in this fishery in 2013 (Fitzpatrick et al, 2014b) indicates however that the majority of fishermen involved in the fishery are opposed to such tradeability. The access restriction itself created some conflict between fishermen as some felt that they were unfairly excluded from a fishery due to not participating when stocks were low. Another area where there has been an attempt to strengthen rights based management has been in the establishment of the sentinel fishery which has a twofold aim. 
UK
UK fishermen can join any PO in any part of the country, however, so that although most POs do have a strong regional identity, members are often attracted by the quota management systems or specialisations offered by the PO. Thus, for example, the SWFPO membership includes beam trawlers and scallop dredgers from outside the Southwest, even Scotland.
Although there is an active FQA/quota market in the UK, and fishing firms routinely use the money value of FQAs as security for bank loans, the legal position is that FQAs are not private property in law. This was tested recently in a UK High Court judgement which found that Government had the right to allocate FQAs as it saw fit, without financial compensation, and that fishing firms had no "legitimate expectation" that the rights conferred by FQAs amounted to possession. This is despite the fact that FQAs had been adjusted to reflect private quota trades three times (in 2001, 2005 and 2011) . Table 3 compares various co-management processes in the Western waters based on Sen and
Discussion
Nielsen's typology (Table 1) This centralized regime is combined with self-management for quota pooling in the particular case of the bluefin tuna, and therefore the system can be best characterized as co-management by partnership. A specific scheme is applied for the anchovy fishery, where daily limits are adopted and managed within the "cofradía" as self-management. Traditional top-down hierarchical management by the state is applied to the mackerel fishery. In this last case, fishermen's behavior is subjected to strong control. For other fisheries regulations compliance contributes to the success of the management measures. Regarding Basque trawlers, the ITQ system comes from a centralized regime except for some issues. Pooling ITQs are organized within the corresponding PO under a self-management regime which contributes to the success of this fishery, with high regulatory compliance by fishermen. Again, this system can be considered to be "co-management by partnership".
The English FQA/PO system can be best characterised as "co-management by partnership" since, given the quota allocation system decided at central government level the POs have a considerable degree of flexibility to manage quota at the local/sectoral level. It is important to appreciate that enforcement remains the task of Government while the ability to trade quota is restricted in the sense that permanent changes in quota "ownership" are still a relatively minor part of the overall trading activity. One of the major recent trends in the European fishing sector has been the increasing role of the fishermen's cooperatives (e.g. Producer Organizations -POs) in quota management.
Various forms of co-management have been used, by delegation, by partnership, through selfmanagement procedure or top-down hierarchical management.
In France, the Central Administration has gradually transferred the allocation quota procedures between fishermen to local level. In view of quota over-consumption situations,
POs have had to introduce new rules within their organisations to impose limitations on individual consumption by species. In Spain this trend has been noted in the context of purseseiners where "cofradías" are able to manage anchovy on the basis of daily limits. In turn, blue-fin tuna are managed at the PO level on the basis of individual quota pooling. In the case of trawling, POs also manage the transferability of the ITQs. The Celtic Sea Herring fishery represents a fairly unique situation in Ireland as the local management committee has a strong input to quota management decisions while in other Irish fisheries quota management has not been devolved to the PO's. The introduction of a more defined restricted access regime in the main fishery has resulted in the issue of nationally-tradable quotas being discussed more frequently. In the UK, devolved management of quotas has a long history and the system of PO quota management is now well established. While differences remain between POs in the extent to which the market is permitted to play a role in their internal quota allocation, all POs now find they must allow some quota trading by their members. Whether the UK will follow the Netherlands and Denmark in moving any closer to an ITQ system proper (with continued PO responsibility) is unclear.
Conclusion
Several changes in the governance of quotas and the economic context have marked this recent period. Faced with increasing restrictions on accessing fish stocks, various new management measurements have been introduced, including individualizing fishing rights, access limits and other specific measures. The main issues arising for the WW from the latest CFP reform concern the implementation of landings obligations (discard bans). It remains to be seen how these will be introduced into the WW fisheries but the devolved flexibility of quota allocation within the POs is likely to play an important role in matching catch and quota holdings. The implementation of these individual fishing rights schemes and other limited access regimes reflect the European debate on transferable fishing concessions within the CFP third reform. It would be a legitimate question to ask whether public leasing on the level of fishermen cooperatives would be a sustainable system for the WW fisheries or whether the recently implemented system is on a "slippery slope" towards market privatization. It is too early to predict how attitudes and perceptions with regard to quota trading and compliance may change as the discard bans start to be put in place. We should perhaps highlight the fact that solving the discard problem may require a more flexible approach such as quota swaps between POs of different member states.
